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{{Short description|Armament resolution by NATO}}
{{Short description|Armament resolution by NATO}}
[[File:Massale vredesdemonstratie in Bonn tegen de modernisering van kernwapens in West, Bestanddeelnr 253-8611.jpg|thumb|Protest in [[Bonn]] against the [[nuclear arms race]] between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 1981]]
[[File:Massale vredesdemonstratie in Bonn tegen de modernisering van kernwapens in West, Bestanddeelnr 253-8611.jpg|thumb|Protest in [[Bonn]] against the [[nuclear arms race]] between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 1981]]
The '''NATO Double-Track Decision''' was the decision by [[NATO]] from December 12, 1979, to offer the [[Warsaw Pact]] a mutual limitation of [[medium-range ballistic missile]]s and [[intermediate-range ballistic missile]]s.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-at-70-lessons-from-the-cold-war/|title=NATO at 70: Lessons from the Cold War|last=Trakimavicius|first=Lukas|work=Atlantic Council|access-date=2021-12-02|language=en-US}}</ref> It was combined with a threat by NATO to deploy more medium-range [[nuclear weapons]] in [[Western Europe]] after the Euromissile Crisis.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb301/index.htm|title=Thirtieth Anniversary of NATO's Dual-Track Decision|website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu}}</ref>
The '''NATO Double-Track Decision''' was the decision by [[NATO]] from December 12, 1979, to offer the Soviet Union and [[Warsaw Pact]] a mutual limitation of [[medium-range ballistic missile]]s and [[intermediate-range ballistic missile]]s amidst the [[Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-at-70-lessons-from-the-cold-war/|title=NATO at 70: Lessons from the Cold War|last=Trakimavicius|first=Lukas|work=Atlantic Council|access-date=2021-12-02|language=en-US}}</ref> In case of refusal, NATO planned to deploy more medium-range [[nuclear weapons]] in [[Western Europe]] after the Euromissile Crisis.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb301/index.htm|title=Thirtieth Anniversary of NATO's Dual-Track Decision|website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu}}</ref>


== Background ==
== Background ==
The [[Détente#Strategic Arms Limitations Talks|détente]] between the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] culminated in the signing of [[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks#SALT I Treaty|SALT I]] and [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty]] (1972) and the negotiations toward [[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks#SALT II Treaty|SALT II]] (1979). Through these agreements, the two countries agreed to freeze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels, reduce the number of [[Anti-ballistic missile|anti-ballistic missiles]] and not build more ground-based launchers.
The [[Détente#Strategic Arms Limitations Talks|détente]] between the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] culminated in the signing of [[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks#SALT I Treaty|SALT I]] and [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty]] (1972) and the negotiations toward [[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks#SALT II Treaty|SALT II]] (1979). Through these agreements, the two countries agreed to freeze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels, reduce the number of [[Anti-ballistic missile|anti-ballistic missiles]] and not build more ground-based launchers.


Along the 1973 [[Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War]] these [[arms control]] measures caused European NATO, especially [[West Germany]] to feel overlooked.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Heuser |first=Beatrice |title=NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 |date=12 December 1997 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan London |year= |isbn=978-0-312-17498-9 |pages=21}}</ref> On 28 October 1977, Chancellor [[Helmut Schmidt]] gave a speech at the [[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] in London in which he condemned the threat posed to Western Europe by the [[RSD-10 Pioneer|SS-20]] missiles being deployed by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe earlier that year and publicly expressed a European concern that the strategic nuclear parity reduced the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee and exacerbated the military imbalance within Europe.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |url=https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25241 |title=The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War |date=2015 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-0-8047-9286-8 |location=Stanford |page=127}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Becker-Schaum |first=Christoph |title=The Nuclear Crisis: The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s |last2=Gassert |first2=Philipp |last3=Mausbach |first3=Wilfried |last4=Klimke |first4=Martin |last5=Zepp |first5=Marianne |publisher=Berghahn |year=2016 |isbn=978-1785332678 |location=New York |pages=73}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Pincus |first=Walter |date=25 October 1983 |title=Soviets' Posture Shifts as SS20s Deployed |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/10/25/soviets-posture-shifts-as-ss20s-deployed/83eab566-9e11-4485-8c0a-68a64b4798fb/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=[[Washington Post]] |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Schmidt |first=Helmut |date=3 March 2008 |title=The 1977 Alastair Buchan memorial lecture |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396337808441722 |journal=Survival |language=en |volume=20 |issue=1 |pages=2–10 |doi=10.1080/00396337808441722 |issn=0039-6338}}</ref> The road-mobile SS-20 missile was capable of carrying up to three [[Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle|MIRV]] warheads and was more accurate than the previously deployed [[R-12 Dvina|SS-4]] and [[R-14 Chusovaya|SS-5]] missiles.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Rose |first=François de |date=1979-06-01 |title=Europe and America: The Future of SALT and Western Security in Europe |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1979-06-01/europe-and-america-future-salt-and-western-security-europe |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=57 |issue=5 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref>
Along with the 1973 [[Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War]] these [[arms control]] measures caused European NATO members, especially [[West Germany]] to feel overlooked.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Heuser |first=Beatrice |title=NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 |date=12 December 1997 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan London |isbn=978-0-312-17498-9 |pages=21}}</ref> On 28 October 1977, Chancellor [[Helmut Schmidt]] gave a speech at the [[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] in London in which he condemned the threat posed to Western Europe by the [[RSD-10 Pioneer|SS-20]] missiles being deployed by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe earlier that year and publicly expressed a European concern that the strategic nuclear parity reduced the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee and exacerbated the military imbalance within Europe.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |url=https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25241 |title=The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War |date=2015 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-0-8047-9286-8 |location=Stanford |page=127}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Becker-Schaum |first1=Christoph |title=The Nuclear Crisis: The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s |last2=Gassert |first2=Philipp |last3=Mausbach |first3=Wilfried |last4=Klimke |first4=Martin |last5=Zepp |first5=Marianne |publisher=Berghahn |year=2016 |isbn=978-1785332678 |location=New York |pages=73}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Pincus |first=Walter |date=25 October 1983 |title=Soviets' Posture Shifts as SS20s Deployed |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/10/25/soviets-posture-shifts-as-ss20s-deployed/83eab566-9e11-4485-8c0a-68a64b4798fb/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |newspaper=[[Washington Post]] |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Schmidt |first=Helmut |date=3 March 2008 |title=The 1977 Alastair Buchan memorial lecture |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396337808441722 |journal=Survival |language=en |volume=20 |issue=1 |pages=2–10 |doi=10.1080/00396337808441722 |issn=0039-6338}}</ref> The road-mobile SS-20 missile was capable of carrying up to three [[Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle|MIRV]] warheads and was more accurate than the previously deployed [[R-12 Dvina|SS-4]] and [[R-14 Chusovaya|SS-5]] missiles.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Rose |first=François de |date=1979-06-01 |title=Europe and America: The Future of SALT and Western Security in Europe |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1979-06-01/europe-and-america-future-salt-and-western-security-europe |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=57 |issue=5 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref>


The strategic nuclear parity between the United States and Soviet Union achieved through the SALT I, ABM and SALT II arms control agreements and development of new [[Intermediate-range ballistic missile|intermediate-range]] nuclear by the Soviet Union led to fears of "decoupling" among non-nuclear European NATO members.<ref name=":0" /> According to Noel D. Cary, "unless America was unswervingly prepared to risk the sacrifice of one of its cities to save a German one, West Germany might be vulnerable to Soviet political blackmail."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Cary |first=Noel D. |date=27 March 2019 |title=Helmut Schmidt, Euromissiles, and the Peace Movement |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/central-european-history/article/helmut-schmidt-euromissiles-and-the-peace-movement/0224307D6763423CCFDB941FAC708C6E |journal=Central European History |language=en |volume=52 |issue=1 |pages=148–171 |doi=10.1017/S0008938919000104 |issn=0008-9389}}</ref>
The strategic nuclear parity between the United States and Soviet Union achieved through the SALT I, ABM and SALT II arms control agreements and development of new [[Intermediate-range ballistic missile|intermediate-range]] nuclear by the Soviet Union led to fears of "decoupling" among non-nuclear European NATO members.<ref name=":0" /> According to Noel D. Cary, "unless America was unswervingly prepared to risk the sacrifice of one of its cities to save a German one, West Germany might be vulnerable to Soviet political blackmail."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Cary |first=Noel D. |date=27 March 2019 |title=Helmut Schmidt, Euromissiles, and the Peace Movement |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/central-european-history/article/helmut-schmidt-euromissiles-and-the-peace-movement/0224307D6763423CCFDB941FAC708C6E |journal=Central European History |language=en |volume=52 |issue=1 |pages=148–171 |doi=10.1017/S0008938919000104 |issn=0008-9389}}</ref>
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The decision was prompted by the continuing military buildup of [[Warsaw Pact]] countries, particularly their growing capability in nuclear systems threatening [[Western Europe]]. European [[NATO]] members were especially concerned about the growth of long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) such as the [[RSD-10 Pioneer|SS-20]] and [[Tupolev Tu-22M]] 'Backfire' bomber.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |date=2009-02-27 |title=NATO Basic Documents |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090227173641/http:/www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b791212a.htm |access-date=2024-05-14 |website=web.archive.org}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite web |title=NATO – Official text: Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The ''Double-Track'' Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces), 12 Dec. 1979 |url=https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27040.htm}}</ref>
The decision was prompted by the continuing military buildup of [[Warsaw Pact]] countries, particularly their growing capability in nuclear systems threatening [[Western Europe]]. European [[NATO]] members were especially concerned about the growth of long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) such as the [[RSD-10 Pioneer|SS-20]] and [[Tupolev Tu-22M]] 'Backfire' bomber.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |date=2009-02-27 |title=NATO Basic Documents |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090227173641/http:/www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b791212a.htm |access-date=2024-05-14 |website=web.archive.org}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite web |title=NATO – Official text: Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The ''Double-Track'' Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces), 12 Dec. 1979 |url=https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27040.htm}}</ref>


On 12 December 1979, at a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers in [[Brussels]], the so-called NATO Double-Track Decision was adopted. The ministers resolved to modernise NATO's LRTNF by deploying 108 [[Pershing II]] launchers to replace the existing American [[MGM-31 Pershing#Pershing 1a|Pershing 1a]] missiles and an additional 464 [[BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile|BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missiles]] ("track two")<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /><ref>{{Cite news |last=Trakimavicius |first=Lukas |title=NATO at 70: Lessons from the Cold War |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-at-70-lessons-from-the-cold-war/ |access-date=2021-12-02 |work=Atlantic Council |language=en-US}}</ref> if negotiations for reciprocal limits ("track one") failed by the fall of 1983.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Søe |first=Christian |date=April 1995 |title=Jeffrey Herf. War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles |url=https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/100.2.497 |journal=The American Historical Review |language=en |volume=100 |issue=2 |doi=10.1086/ahr/100.2.497 |issn=1937-5239}}</ref> NATO offered immediate negotiations with the goal to ban nuclear armed middle-range missiles from Europe completely, with the provision that the missiles could be installed four years later if the negotiations failed.
On 12 December 1979, at a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers in [[Brussels]], the so-called NATO Double-Track Decision was adopted. The ministers resolved to modernise NATO's LRTNF by deploying 108 [[Pershing II]] launchers to replace the existing American [[MGM-31 Pershing#Pershing 1a|Pershing 1a]] missiles and an additional 464 [[BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile|BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missiles]] (GLCMs) ("track two")<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /><ref>{{Cite news |last=Trakimavicius |first=Lukas |title=NATO at 70: Lessons from the Cold War |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-at-70-lessons-from-the-cold-war/ |access-date=2021-12-02 |work=Atlantic Council |language=en-US}}</ref> if negotiations for reciprocal limits ("track one") failed by the fall of 1983.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Søe |first=Christian |date=April 1995 |title=Jeffrey Herf. War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles |url=https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/100.2.497 |journal=The American Historical Review |language=en |volume=100 |issue=2 |doi=10.1086/ahr/100.2.497 |issn=1937-5239}}</ref> NATO offered immediate negotiations with the goal to ban nuclear armed middle-range missiles from Europe completely, with the provision that the missiles could be installed four years later if the negotiations failed.


The [[Soviet Union]] was critical of the fact that neither [[France and weapons of mass destruction|French]] nor [[Nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom|British]] nuclear weapons had been considered in the arms control negotiations.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Drozdiak |first=William |date=20 January 1983 |title=Mitterrand Gives Boost to Kohl in Speech on Arms |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/01/21/mitterrand-gives-boost-to-kohl-in-speech-on-arms/b1591bce-a7c7-494f-83d5-9e9d25682cdb/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Washington Post |location=Bonn |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>
The [[Soviet Union]] was critical of the fact that neither [[France and weapons of mass destruction|French]] nor [[Nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom|British]] nuclear weapons had been considered in the arms control negotiations.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Drozdiak |first=William |date=20 January 1983 |title=Mitterrand Gives Boost to Kohl in Speech on Arms |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/01/21/mitterrand-gives-boost-to-kohl-in-speech-on-arms/b1591bce-a7c7-494f-83d5-9e9d25682cdb/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |newspaper=Washington Post |location=Bonn |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>


==Protests==
=== Protests ===
Soon after the NATO Double Track Decision opposition started to mount. November 1980 [[Gert Bastian]] and [[Josef Weber]] drafted the ''Krefeld appeal'' calling for the federal government of [[West Germany]] to retract its support for the deployment of [[Pershing II]] missiles and [[cruise missile]]s in Central Europe. The ''Krefeld appeal'' also called upon West Germany to oppose a [[nuclear arms race]], emphasizing that the nuclear armament of the two [[Cold War]] superpowers is endangering Europeans in particular. By 1983 the ''Krefeld appeal'' had gained five million signatures and opposition to the NATO Double Track Decision became a minimal consensus for the [[peace movement]].<ref>{{Cite book|title= German Angst: Fear and Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany | author1=Frank Biess |publisher= Oxford University Press |year=2020 |isbn=9780198714187 | pages=315}}</ref>
Soon after the NATO Double Track Decision opposition started to mount. In November 1980, [[Alliance 90/The Greens|German Green Party]] politician [[Gert Bastian]] and footballer [[Josef Weber]] drafted the ''Krefeld appeal'' calling for the federal government of [[West Germany]] to retract its support for the deployment of [[Pershing II]] missiles in the country and GLCMs across Europe. The ''Krefeld appeal'' also called upon West Germany to oppose a [[nuclear arms race]], emphasizing that the nuclear armament of the two [[Cold War]] superpowers is endangering Europeans in particular. By 1983 the ''Krefeld appeal'' had gained five million signatures and opposition to the NATO Double Track Decision became a minimal consensus for the [[peace movement]].<ref>{{Cite book|title= German Angst: Fear and Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany | author1=Frank Biess |publisher= Oxford University Press |year=2020 |isbn=9780198714187 | pages=315}}</ref>


== "Track One" negotiations ==
== "Track One" negotiations ==
{{See also|Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty#Negotiations#Early negotiations: 1981–1983}}
{{See also|Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty#Negotiations#Early negotiations: 1981–1983}}
The Soviet Union and United States agreed to open negotiations and preliminary discussions, named the Preliminary Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks,<ref name="faschron">{{cite web |title=Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Chronology |url=http://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/inf-chron.htm |access-date=15 August 2016 |publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]]}}</ref> which began in [[Geneva]], Switzerland, in October 1980. The relations were strained at the time due to the December 1979 [[Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]] which led America to impose sanctions against the USSR.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Talbott |first=Strobe |date=1979-01-01 |title=U.S.-Soviet Relations: From Bad to Worse |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1979-01-01/us-soviet-relations-bad-worse |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=58 |issue=3 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref> Formal talks began on 30 November 1981, with the US negotiators led by President [[Ronald Reagan]] and those of the Soviet Union by [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary]], [[Leonid Brezhnev]]. The core of the US negotiating position reflected the principles put forth during the [[Presidency of Jimmy Carter]]: any limits placed on US intermediate-range capabilities, both in terms of "ceilings" and "rights", must be reciprocated with limits on Soviet systems. Additionally, the US insisted that a sufficient verification regime be put in place.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|pp=6, 9}}
The Soviet Union and United States agreed to open negotiations and preliminary discussions, named the Preliminary Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks,<ref name="faschron">{{cite web |title=Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Chronology |url=http://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/inf-chron.htm |access-date=15 August 2016 |publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]]}}</ref> which began in [[Geneva]], Switzerland, in October 1980. The relations were strained at the time due to the December 1979 [[Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]] which led America to impose sanctions against the USSR.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Talbott |first=Strobe |date=1979-01-01 |title=U.S.-Soviet Relations: From Bad to Worse |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1979-01-01/us-soviet-relations-bad-worse |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=58 |issue=3 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref> Formal talks began on 30 November 1981, with the U.S. negotiators led by President [[Ronald Reagan]] and those of the Soviet Union by [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary]], [[Leonid Brezhnev]]. The core of the U.S. negotiating position reflected the principles put forth during the [[Presidency of Jimmy Carter]]: any limits placed on U.S. intermediate-range capabilities, both in terms of "ceilings" and "rights", must be reciprocated with limits on Soviet systems. Additionally, the United States insisted that a sufficient verification regime be put in place due to their low trust in the Russians.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|pp=6, 9}}


Between 1981 and 1983, American and Soviet negotiators gathered for six rounds of talks, each two months in length—a system based on the earlier SALT talks.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=9}}<ref>{{Cite news |last=Hoffmann |first=Stanley |date=1981-12-01 |title=NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reasons and Unreason |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1981-12-01/nato-and-nuclear-weapons-reasons-and-unreason |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=60 |issue=2 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref> The US delegation was composed of [[Paul Nitze]], [[Major general (United States)|Major General]] William F. Burns of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], [[Thomas Graham Jr. (diplomat)|Thomas Graham]] of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]] (ACDA), and officials from the [[US Department of State]], [[Office of the Secretary of Defense]], and [[US National Security Council]].<ref name="adst">{{cite web |date=30 March 2016 |title=Paul Nitze and A Walk in the Woods – A Failed Attempt at Arms Control |url=http://adst.org/2016/03/paul-nitze-and-a-walk-in-the-woods-a-failed-attempt-at-arms-control/ |access-date=19 August 2016 |publisher=[[Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training]]}}</ref><ref name="burns">{{cite web |date=7 January 1988 |title=Nomination of William F. Burns To Be Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency |url=https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1988/010788a.htm |access-date=19 August 2016 |publisher=[[Ronald Reagan Presidential Library]]}}</ref> In the fall of 1983, just ahead of the scheduled deployment of US Pershing IIs and GLCMs, the United States lowered its proposed limit on global INF deployments to 420 missiles, while the Soviet Union proposed "equal reductions": if the US cancelled the planned deployment of Pershing II and GLCM systems, the Soviet Union would reduce its own INF deployment by 572 warheads.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Rose |first=Francois de |date=1982-09-01 |title=Inflexible Response |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1982-09-01/inflexible-response |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=61 |issue=1 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Bell |first=Coral |date=1985-02-01 |title=From Carter to Reagan |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/carter-reagan |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=63 |issue=3 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Adelman |first=Kenneth L. |date=1984-12-01 |title=Arms Control With and Without Agreements |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1984-12-01/arms-control-and-without-agreements |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=63 |issue=2 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref> In November 1983, after the first Pershing IIs arrived in West Germany, the Soviet Union ended negotiations.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-12-26 |title=Mitterrand Tells West: Maintain Missiles Resolve |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/11/17/mitterrand-tells-west-maintain-missiles-resolve/9138f210-1b14-4b4b-9ebb-5aaa83765e5a/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=10}}<ref>{{Cite news |last=Drozdiak |first=William |date=8 December 1983 |title=Soviets Halt Strategic Arms Talks |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/12/09/soviets-halt-strategic-arms-talks/5ec90e4c-8b95-4be0-9265-1e622f706176/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Washington Post |location=Geneva |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>
Between 1981 and 1983, American and Soviet negotiators gathered for six rounds of talks, each two months in length—a system based on the earlier SALT talks.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=9}}<ref>{{Cite news |last=Hoffmann |first=Stanley |date=1981-12-01 |title=NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reasons and Unreason |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1981-12-01/nato-and-nuclear-weapons-reasons-and-unreason |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=60 |issue=2 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref> The US delegation was composed of [[Paul Nitze]], [[Major general (United States)|Major General]] William F. Burns of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], [[Thomas Graham Jr. (diplomat)|Thomas Graham]] of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]] (ACDA), and officials from the [[US Department of State]], [[Office of the Secretary of Defense]], and [[US National Security Council]].<ref name="adst">{{cite web |date=30 March 2016 |title=Paul Nitze and A Walk in the Woods – A Failed Attempt at Arms Control |url=http://adst.org/2016/03/paul-nitze-and-a-walk-in-the-woods-a-failed-attempt-at-arms-control/ |access-date=19 August 2016 |publisher=[[Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training]]}}</ref><ref name="burns">{{cite web |date=7 January 1988 |title=Nomination of William F. Burns To Be Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency |url=https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1988/010788a.htm |access-date=19 August 2016 |publisher=[[Ronald Reagan Presidential Library]]}}</ref> In the fall of 1983, just ahead of the scheduled deployment of US Pershing IIs and GLCMs, the United States lowered its proposed limit on global INF deployments to 420 missiles, while the Soviet Union proposed "equal reductions": if the US cancelled the planned deployment of Pershing II and GLCM systems, the Soviet Union would reduce its own INF deployment by 572 warheads.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Rose |first=Francois de |date=1982-09-01 |title=Inflexible Response |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1982-09-01/inflexible-response |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=61 |issue=1 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Bell |first=Coral |date=1985-02-01 |title=From Carter to Reagan |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/carter-reagan |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=63 |issue=3 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Adelman |first=Kenneth L. |date=1984-12-01 |title=Arms Control With and Without Agreements |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1984-12-01/arms-control-and-without-agreements |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=Foreign Affairs |language=en-US |volume=63 |issue=2 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref> In November 1983, after the first Pershing IIs arrived in West Germany, the Soviet Union ended negotiations.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-12-26 |title=Mitterrand Tells West: Maintain Missiles Resolve |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/11/17/mitterrand-tells-west-maintain-missiles-resolve/9138f210-1b14-4b4b-9ebb-5aaa83765e5a/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |newspaper=Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=10}}<ref>{{Cite news |last=Drozdiak |first=William |date=8 December 1983 |title=Soviets Halt Strategic Arms Talks |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/12/09/soviets-halt-strategic-arms-talks/5ec90e4c-8b95-4be0-9265-1e622f706176/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |newspaper=Washington Post |location=Geneva |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>


=== Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ===
=== Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ===
{{Main|Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty}}
{{Main|Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty}}
On 8 December 1987 the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] signed the [[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]]. This [[treaty]] reverted the double-track policy.<ref>{{Cite book|title= The Cold War: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection [5 Volumes] | editor1= Spencer C. Tucker |publisher= ABC-CLIO |year=2020 |isbn= 9781440860768 | pages=434}}</ref> This treaty also provided for the destruction of all middle-range weapons and ended this episode of the [[Cold War]].
On 8 December 1987 the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] signed the [[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]]. This [[treaty]] reverted the double-track policy.<ref>{{Cite book|title= The Cold War: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection [5 Volumes] | editor1= Spencer C. Tucker |publisher= ABC-CLIO |year=2020 |isbn= 9781440860768 | pages=434}}</ref> This treaty also provided for the destruction of all middle-range weapons and ended this episode of the [[Cold War]].

== "Track Two" deployments ==

=== Pershing II ===
The Pershing II launchers began to be deployed in West Germany in late November 1983 and the deployment of 108 launchers was completed in late 1985.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Markham |first=James M. |date=1983-11-24 |title=FIRST U.S. PERSHING MISSILES DELIVERED IN WEST GERMANY |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/24/world/first-us-pershing-missiles-delivered-in-west-germany.html |access-date=2024-05-13 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Initial Operational Status (IOS) was achieved on 15 December 1983 when A Battery, [[1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment]] rotated onto operational status at the Missile Storage Area (MSA) in [[Mutlangen]]. The West German government announced on 13 December 1985 that the US Army [[56th Artillery Command#56th Field Artillery Brigade|56th Field Artillery Brigade]] was equipped with 108 Pershing II launchers across three missile battalions stationed at [[Neu-Ulm]], Mutlangen and [[Neckarsulm]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-12-28 |title=Pershing Missiles Now All in Place |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/12/14/pershing-missiles-now-all-in-place/1292d11c-1f06-4fb0-92f9-5975f80357e1/ |access-date=2024-05-13 |newspaper=Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Pincus |first=Walter |date=15 October 1983 |title=Pershings Packed to Go |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/10/16/pershings-packed-to-go/cf23b3ae-fdc4-4986-8e2c-3495b2bfa5a3/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |newspaper=Washington Post |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>

=== BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile ===
464 BGM-109G missiles would be based at six locations throughout Europe: 160 at [[RAF Greenham Common]] and [[RAF Molesworth]] in the United Kingdom, 112 at [[Comiso Airport#1981–1991|Comiso Air Station]] in Italy,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Gilbert |first=Sari |date=15 April 1982 |title=Italy Begins Cruise Missile Base Despite Left's Protest |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/04/15/italy-begins-cruise-missile-base-despite-lefts-protest/ef577fcd-1f53-4956-ac35-3b132a912ac4/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |newspaper=Washington Post |location=Rome}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Pincus |first=Walter |date=5 November 1983 |title=Cruise Missiles to Be Placed At Temporary Site in Sicily |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/11/06/cruise-missiles-to-be-placed-at-temporary-site-in-sicily/d116630e-da0e-446a-b3d7-dc7fe3921bfb/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last= |date=1983-11-28 |title=COMPONENTS OF THE CRUISE ARRIVE IN ITALY |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/28/world/components-of-the-cruise-arrive-in-italy.html |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> 96 at [[Pydna (missile base)|Wueschheim Air Station]] in West Germany,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Fisher |first=Marc |date=11 April 1990 |title=CRUISE MISSILE 'DRAWDOWN' BEGINS AT U.S. AIR BASE IN WEST GERMANY |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/04/12/cruise-missile-drawdown-begins-at-us-air-base-in-west-germany/2ec6db6a-a062-4f91-bf1b-b8d63c667ce1/ |url-status= |access-date=2024-05-14 |newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref> 48 at the [[Woensdrecht Air Base]] in the Netherlands,<ref>{{Cite journal |date=4 November 1985 |title=Agreement Between The United States Of America And The Netherlands Concerning The Stationing, Support And Operation Of The Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) System In The Territory Of The Netherlands |url=https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789210543965s002-c039 |access-date=2024-05-14 |website=www.un-ilibrary.org |place=The Hague |language=en |doi=10.18356/085bfbf8-en-fr}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite news |date=10 December 1987 |title=The Verification Sites |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/12/10/the-verification-sites/accf47a9-a92b-4c9e-a79e-0ac1ddbd88f5/ |newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref> and 48 at the [[Florennes Air Base]] in Belgium.<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite news |date=13 December 1988 |title=Belgium Removes Last Cruise Missile |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/national/1988/12/14/belgium-removes-last-cruise-missile/143a5dee-18d5-46ce-82bd-74bd64160c2a/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Montgomery |first1=Paul L. |last2=Times |first2=Special To the New York |date=1988-12-14 |title=U.S. Flies the Last Cruise Missiles Out of Belgium |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/14/world/us-flies-the-last-cruise-missiles-out-of-belgium.html |access-date=2024-05-14 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Dryden |first=Stephen |date=14 March 1985 |title=Belgium to Deploy Cruise Missiles |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/03/15/belgium-to-deploy-cruise-missiles/5478c797-e14b-4381-8155-cfcc4d947c48/ |access-date=2024-05-14 |newspaper=Washington Post |location=Brussels}}</ref>


==References==
==References==


{{reflist}}
{{reflist}}

=== Works cited ===
* {{cite report |url=https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/30-arms-control-pifer-paper.pdf |access-date=16 August 2016 |title=The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: History and Lessons Learned |last1=Bohlen |first1=Avis |author1-link=Avis Bohlen |last2=Burns |first2=William |last3=Pifer |first3=Steven |author3-link=Steven Pifer |last4=Woodworth |first4=John |year=2012 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution]] |location=Washington, D.C. }}


{{Authority control}}
{{Authority control}}

Latest revision as of 22:18, 25 June 2024

Protest in Bonn against the nuclear arms race between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 1981

The NATO Double-Track Decision was the decision by NATO from December 12, 1979, to offer the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact a mutual limitation of medium-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles amidst the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[1] In case of refusal, NATO planned to deploy more medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe after the Euromissile Crisis.[2]

Background[edit]

The détente between the United States and the Soviet Union culminated in the signing of SALT I and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) and the negotiations toward SALT II (1979). Through these agreements, the two countries agreed to freeze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels, reduce the number of anti-ballistic missiles and not build more ground-based launchers.

Along with the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War these arms control measures caused European NATO members, especially West Germany to feel overlooked.[3] On 28 October 1977, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt gave a speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in which he condemned the threat posed to Western Europe by the SS-20 missiles being deployed by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe earlier that year and publicly expressed a European concern that the strategic nuclear parity reduced the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee and exacerbated the military imbalance within Europe.[4][5][6][7] The road-mobile SS-20 missile was capable of carrying up to three MIRV warheads and was more accurate than the previously deployed SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.[8]

The strategic nuclear parity between the United States and Soviet Union achieved through the SALT I, ABM and SALT II arms control agreements and development of new intermediate-range nuclear by the Soviet Union led to fears of "decoupling" among non-nuclear European NATO members.[4] According to Noel D. Cary, "unless America was unswervingly prepared to risk the sacrifice of one of its cities to save a German one, West Germany might be vulnerable to Soviet political blackmail."[9]

NATO Double-Track Decision[edit]

SS-20 and Pershing II missiles, National Air and Space Museum

The decision was prompted by the continuing military buildup of Warsaw Pact countries, particularly their growing capability in nuclear systems threatening Western Europe. European NATO members were especially concerned about the growth of long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) such as the SS-20 and Tupolev Tu-22M 'Backfire' bomber.[10][11]

On 12 December 1979, at a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels, the so-called NATO Double-Track Decision was adopted. The ministers resolved to modernise NATO's LRTNF by deploying 108 Pershing II launchers to replace the existing American Pershing 1a missiles and an additional 464 BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) ("track two")[10][11][12] if negotiations for reciprocal limits ("track one") failed by the fall of 1983.[13] NATO offered immediate negotiations with the goal to ban nuclear armed middle-range missiles from Europe completely, with the provision that the missiles could be installed four years later if the negotiations failed.

The Soviet Union was critical of the fact that neither French nor British nuclear weapons had been considered in the arms control negotiations.[14]

Protests[edit]

Soon after the NATO Double Track Decision opposition started to mount. In November 1980, German Green Party politician Gert Bastian and footballer Josef Weber drafted the Krefeld appeal calling for the federal government of West Germany to retract its support for the deployment of Pershing II missiles in the country and GLCMs across Europe. The Krefeld appeal also called upon West Germany to oppose a nuclear arms race, emphasizing that the nuclear armament of the two Cold War superpowers is endangering Europeans in particular. By 1983 the Krefeld appeal had gained five million signatures and opposition to the NATO Double Track Decision became a minimal consensus for the peace movement.[15]

"Track One" negotiations[edit]

See also: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty § Negotiations#Early negotiations: 1981–1983

The Soviet Union and United States agreed to open negotiations and preliminary discussions, named the Preliminary Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks,[16] which began in Geneva, Switzerland, in October 1980. The relations were strained at the time due to the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which led America to impose sanctions against the USSR.[17] Formal talks began on 30 November 1981, with the U.S. negotiators led by President Ronald Reagan and those of the Soviet Union by General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev. The core of the U.S. negotiating position reflected the principles put forth during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter: any limits placed on U.S. intermediate-range capabilities, both in terms of "ceilings" and "rights", must be reciprocated with limits on Soviet systems. Additionally, the United States insisted that a sufficient verification regime be put in place due to their low trust in the Russians.[18]

Between 1981 and 1983, American and Soviet negotiators gathered for six rounds of talks, each two months in length—a system based on the earlier SALT talks.[19][20] The US delegation was composed of Paul Nitze, Major General William F. Burns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Thomas Graham of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and officials from the US Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and US National Security Council.[21][22] In the fall of 1983, just ahead of the scheduled deployment of US Pershing IIs and GLCMs, the United States lowered its proposed limit on global INF deployments to 420 missiles, while the Soviet Union proposed "equal reductions": if the US cancelled the planned deployment of Pershing II and GLCM systems, the Soviet Union would reduce its own INF deployment by 572 warheads.[23][24][25] In November 1983, after the first Pershing IIs arrived in West Germany, the Soviet Union ended negotiations.[26][27][28]

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty[edit]

Main article: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

On 8 December 1987 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This treaty reverted the double-track policy.[29] This treaty also provided for the destruction of all middle-range weapons and ended this episode of the Cold War.

"Track Two" deployments[edit]

Pershing II[edit]

The Pershing II launchers began to be deployed in West Germany in late November 1983 and the deployment of 108 launchers was completed in late 1985.[30] Initial Operational Status (IOS) was achieved on 15 December 1983 when A Battery, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment rotated onto operational status at the Missile Storage Area (MSA) in Mutlangen. The West German government announced on 13 December 1985 that the US Army 56th Field Artillery Brigade was equipped with 108 Pershing II launchers across three missile battalions stationed at Neu-Ulm, Mutlangen and Neckarsulm.[31][32]

BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile[edit]

464 BGM-109G missiles would be based at six locations throughout Europe: 160 at RAF Greenham Common and RAF Molesworth in the United Kingdom, 112 at Comiso Air Station in Italy,[33][34][35] 96 at Wueschheim Air Station in West Germany,[36] 48 at the Woensdrecht Air Base in the Netherlands,[37][38] and 48 at the Florennes Air Base in Belgium.[38][39][40][41]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Trakimavicius, Lukas. "NATO at 70: Lessons from the Cold War". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 2021-12-02.
  2. ^ "Thirtieth Anniversary of NATO's Dual-Track Decision". nsarchive2.gwu.edu.
  3. ^ Heuser, Beatrice (12 December 1997). NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000. Palgrave Macmillan London. p. 21. ISBN 978-0-312-17498-9.
  4. ^ a b The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2015. p. 127. ISBN 978-0-8047-9286-8.
  5. ^ Becker-Schaum, Christoph; Gassert, Philipp; Mausbach, Wilfried; Klimke, Martin; Zepp, Marianne (2016). The Nuclear Crisis: The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s. New York: Berghahn. p. 73. ISBN 978-1785332678.
  6. ^ Pincus, Walter (25 October 1983). "Soviets' Posture Shifts as SS20s Deployed". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  7. ^ Schmidt, Helmut (3 March 2008). "The 1977 Alastair Buchan memorial lecture". Survival. 20 (1): 2–10. doi:10.1080/00396337808441722. ISSN 0039-6338.
  8. ^ Rose, François de (1979-06-01). "Europe and America: The Future of SALT and Western Security in Europe". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 57, no. 5. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  9. ^ Cary, Noel D. (27 March 2019). "Helmut Schmidt, Euromissiles, and the Peace Movement". Central European History. 52 (1): 148–171. doi:10.1017/S0008938919000104. ISSN 0008-9389.
  10. ^ a b "NATO Basic Documents". web.archive.org. 2009-02-27. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  11. ^ a b "NATO – Official text: Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The Double-Track Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces), 12 Dec. 1979".
  12. ^ Trakimavicius, Lukas. "NATO at 70: Lessons from the Cold War". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 2021-12-02.
  13. ^ Søe, Christian (April 1995). "Jeffrey Herf. War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles". The American Historical Review. 100 (2). doi:10.1086/ahr/100.2.497. ISSN 1937-5239.
  14. ^ Drozdiak, William (20 January 1983). "Mitterrand Gives Boost to Kohl in Speech on Arms". Washington Post. Bonn. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  15. ^ Frank Biess (2020). German Angst: Fear and Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany. Oxford University Press. p. 315. ISBN 9780198714187.
  16. ^ "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Chronology". Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 15 August 2016.
  17. ^ Talbott, Strobe (1979-01-01). "U.S.-Soviet Relations: From Bad to Worse". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 58, no. 3. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  18. ^ Bohlen et al. 2012, pp. 6, 9.
  19. ^ Bohlen et al. 2012, p. 9.
  20. ^ Hoffmann, Stanley (1981-12-01). "NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reasons and Unreason". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 60, no. 2. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  21. ^ "Paul Nitze and A Walk in the Woods – A Failed Attempt at Arms Control". Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. 30 March 2016. Retrieved 19 August 2016.
  22. ^ "Nomination of William F. Burns To Be Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency". Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 7 January 1988. Retrieved 19 August 2016.
  23. ^ Rose, Francois de (1982-09-01). "Inflexible Response". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 61, no. 1. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  24. ^ Bell, Coral (1985-02-01). "From Carter to Reagan". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 63, no. 3. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  25. ^ Adelman, Kenneth L. (1984-12-01). "Arms Control With and Without Agreements". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 63, no. 2. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  26. ^ "Mitterrand Tells West: Maintain Missiles Resolve". Washington Post. 2023-12-26. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  27. ^ Bohlen et al. 2012, p. 10.
  28. ^ Drozdiak, William (8 December 1983). "Soviets Halt Strategic Arms Talks". Washington Post. Geneva. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  29. ^ Spencer C. Tucker, ed. (2020). The Cold War: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection [5 Volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 434. ISBN 9781440860768.
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Works cited[edit]

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